I think that the conditions that the Prime Minister has brought could have been agreed at any time of the summer through the usual diplomatic channels. And I say this, I think that the Czechs who left themselves to their own devices and said that they would not get the help of western forces, would have been able to make better conditions than they had after all this enormous disruption; they could not have been worse. In a last-minute attempt to avoid war, Chamberlain proposed immediately convening a four-power conference to settle the dispute. Hitler agreed, and on 29 September, Hitler, Chamberlain, Daladier and Italian dictator Benito Mussolini met in Munich. The meeting in Munich began shortly before 1 p.m. Hitler could not hide his anger at not having to comply with the fact that he was going to the Sudetenland on the day he himself had attached to the head of his army, and none of his interlocutors dared to insist that the two Czech diplomats who were waiting in a Munich hotel be admitted to the conference room or consulted on the agenda. Mussolini nevertheless introduced a written plan that was accepted by all as a Munich agreement. (Many years later, it was discovered that the so-called Italian plan had been developed at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.) This was almost identical to Godesberg`s proposal: the Bundeswehr was to complete the occupation of the Sudetenland by 10 October and an international commission had to decide the future of other controversial areas. Czechoslovakia was informed by Great Britain and France that it could either resist only Germany or submit to the prescribed annexes.
The Czechoslovakian government has chosen to submit. All these forces, in addition to other deterrents, the combinations of large and small powers that would have been willing to cling to the front of the law and could have built up themselves for the orderly elimination of dysfunctions, could have been quite effective. Between submission and immediate war, there was this third alternative that gave hope not only to peace, but also to justice. It is quite true that such a policy, in order to succeed, required Britain to declare immediately and well before it united to defend Czechoslovakia against unseeded aggression. Her Majesty`s government refused to give this guarantee if it had saved the situation, but in the end they gave it when it was too late, and now, for the future, they renew it, if they do not have the slightest power to do it well. In that speech, Churchill also made proposals to deal with the increasingly belligerent German state. He called for greater regional cooperation and criticized Chamberlain`s government for cooperating only with France and not with Russia in the Munich negotiations. According to him, as the three dominant powers in Europe, it is up to France, Russia and Britain to prevent Germany from annuling other countries. The Munich agreement worried the small nations of Europe about their security in the face of German influence, which perhaps extended deep into the East. Churchill already regarded the countries of Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia as the future victims of the German annexation.